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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Design is a funny word. Some people think design means how it looks. But 
of course, if you dig deeper, it’s really how it works.” - Steve Jobs2 
 
To say that the Internet is an important part of modern life is uncontrover-
sial. People all over the world use the Internet for everything from banking,3 to 
entertainment,4 social networking,5 and to weight loss.6 The most popular sites 
are valued in the billions of dollars,7 demonstrating that popular and ground-
breaking sites are big business. 
As sites become more popular, so too will the attempts by competitors to 
                                                
 1 Senior Note and Comment Editor, CommLaw Conspectus: Journal of Communica-
tions Law and Technology, Volume 23, J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University 
of America, Columbus School of Law, B.S. Indiana University, 2006, M.S. University of 
Florida, 2008. I would like to thank Professor Megan La Belle for her guidance and com-
ments; everyone at the CommLaw Conspectus for their hard work during the editing pro-
cess; Jeff Greco for his insights into website design; and my wife Laura for her love, sup-
port, and proofreading. 
 2 Gary Wolf, Steve Jobs: The Next Insanely Great Thing, WIRED, 
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/4.02/jobs_pr.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2014). 
 3 See, e.g., MINT.COM, http://www.mint.com (last visited Aug. 6, 2014); CHASE, 
http://www.chase.com (last visited Aug. 6, 2014); BANK OF AMERICA, 
https://www.bankofamerica.com (last visited Aug. 6, 2014). 
 4 See, e.g., YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com (last visited Aug. 6, 2014); HULU, 
http://www.hulu.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2014); NETFLIX, http://www.netflix.com (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2014). 
 5 See, e.g., FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Aug. 6, 2014); TWIT-
TER, https://twitter.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2014). 
 6 See, e.g., MYFITNESSPAL, http://www.myfitnesspal.com (last visited Aug. 6, 2014); 
LOSE IT!, http://loseit.com (last visited Aug. 6, 2014). 
 7 Brian Womack, Facebook Market Value Tops $100 Billion Amid Mobile Push, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-26/facebook-
market-value-tops-100-billion-amid-mobile-ad-push.html. 
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gain visitors to other similar websites by using the goodwill created by popular 
sites.8 It is crucial for consumers to identify the sources of the online sites they 
visit. As a result, website owners have explored various legal remedies to pro-
tect their websites.9 Trademark law is one area that site owners have turned to 
for protection. 
Source identification and the protection of that identification is the goal of 
United States trademark law.10 Historically, trademark law applied to symbols, 
names, logos, or product designs, a concept known as trade dress.11 However, 
trade dress has expanded to include many objects beyond just product design,12 
encompassing the entire “look and feel” of a product or service.13 A number of 
cases have arisen across the country where website owners assert infringement 
of their website’s trade dress by competitors.14 
Trade dress law has its limits, however. Emerging technologies are still con-
strained by the requirements of trademark and trade dress law.15 Trademarks 
that perform some function are not protectable,16 nor are marks that are only 
descriptive of the product or service without unique source identification.17 
Because trade dress protection of websites is a relatively new legal theory, 
                                                
 8 Sebastian Dramburg, Copying Websites – How Far Can You Legally Go ?, VENTURE 
VILLAGE (July 17, 2013), http://venturevillage.eu/copying-websites. 
 9 See, e.g., Sleep Sci. Partners v. Lieberman, No. 09-04200 CW, 2010 WL 1881770, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2010) (plaintiff Sleep Science Partners sought protection of its web-
site’s design and brought suit for “trade dress infringement, copyright infringement, tortious 
interference with contract, common law misappropriation, unfair competition, civil conspi-
racy, and unjust enrichment.”); see also, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (statutory basis for civil 
liability under the Lanham Act, § 43(a)). 
 10 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (a trademark identifies and distinguishes goods). 
 11 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209-10 (2000). 
 12 See, e.g., Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1533 (D. 
Colo. 1986), aff’d, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988) (greeting cards); see, e.g,, Time Inc. 
Magazine Co. v. Globe Commc’ns Corp., 712 F. Supp. 1103, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (maga-
zine cover); see, e.g,, Health o meter, Inc. v. Terraillon Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (bathroom weighing scale). 
 13 See Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1242 (W.D. Wash. 2007) 
(arguing that trade dress protection should be expanded to websites). 
 14 See, e.g., id. (alleging that rival company copied the design of its diamond search 
webpage); Salt Optics, Inc. v. Jand, Inc., No. SACV 10-0828 DOC, 2010 WL 4961702, at 
*5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010) (arguing that defendants intentionally adapted the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted optics website to sell eyewear to the public); 
Conference Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, Inc., CIV. 3:2006-76, 2010 WL 1626072, at *1 
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010) (alleging that defendant copied code from plaintiff’s website). 
 15 See, e.g., Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Should It Be A Free for All? The Challenge of Ex-
tending Trade Dress Protection to the Look and Feel of Web Sites in the Evolving Internet, 
49 AM. U. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2000). 
 16 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001); 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a)(3) (2012). 
 17 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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courts have been apprehensive to apply trade dress law to websites.18 One of 
the first cases to consider that trade dress protection for a website was possible, 
Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc., was not decided until 2007.19 Consequently, 
this area remains mostly unexplored by courts.20 
Although other cases have arisen since Blue Nile, none has proceeded past 
the trial court level.21 Despite the limited decisional law in this area, there are 
two cases that have become frequently cited in trade dress jurisprudence: Con-
ference Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, Inc. and Salt Optics, Inc. v. Jand, Inc. 
22 Conference Archives sets forth a detailed analysis of how to apply trade dress 
law to websites and finds that such a claim is plausible if pleaded properly.23 In 
a similar vein, the Salt Optics court suggested that a successful trade dress 
claim requires a high level of factual support, and then dismissed the plaintiff’s 
trade dress claim for failing to meet that standard.24 The former of these cases, 
Conference Archives, is the subject of this Note. 
Focusing on the Conference Archives case, this Note will explore trade dress 
law in the United States and its application to websites. In particular, it analyz-
es the Conference Archives case, which held that trade dress can apply to web-
sites. Part II discusses the different forms of intellectual property protection 
available in the United States, including utility patents, design patents, copy-
right, traditional trademarks and trade dress. Part III provides a basic introduc-
tion to websites and the principles and concepts that guide website design, cre-
ation, and function. Part III also explores how various forms of intellectual 
property may protect websites. Part IV describes the Conference Archives case 
and evaluates the court’s opinion. Part V argues that the court in Conference 
Archives incorrectly held that the functionality doctrine does not bar trade 
dress protection for websites. Part V also argues that many legal scholars’ ar-
guments regarding website trade dress are flawed as well. Part VI explores 
                                                
 18 See Blue Nile, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 1246 (calling trade dress protection of websites a “a 
novel legal theory”). 
 19 Id. at 1242. 
 20 See, e.g., Nguyen, supra note 15, at 1234; Lisa M. Byerly, Look and Feel Protection 
of Web Site User Interfaces: Copyright or Trade Dress?, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 221, 222-24 (1998); Gary Franklin, Esq., Kevin Henry, Esq., Protecting 
Your Company’s Website: The Application of Intellectual Property to the Digital Market-
place*, 37 VT. B.J. 26 (2011-2012). 
 21 See Parker Waichman LLP v. Gilman Law LLP, No. 12-CV-4784 JS AKT, 2013 WL 
3863928, at *4, *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2013); see also Creative Co-Op, Inc. v. Elizabeth 
Lucas Co., No. CV 11-116-S-REB, 2012 WL 761736, at *2, *3 (D. Idaho Mar. 7, 2012) 
 22 See Salt Optics, Inc. v. Jand, Inc., No. SACV 10-0828 DOC (RNBx), 2010 WL 
4961702 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010); see also Conference Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, 
Inc., Civ. No. 3:2006-76, 2010 WL 1626072 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010). 
 23 Conference Archives, 2010 WL 1626072, at *16. 
 24 Salt Optics, 2010 WL 4961702, at *5, *7. 
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how websites may still find strong protection within existing United States 
intellectual property law.  
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 
United States law provides many different forms of protection for intellectu-
al property including patents, copyrights, and trademarks.25  To fully compre-
hend trade dress and the scope of its protections, one must gain a thorough un-
derstanding of intellectual property law.26 
A. United States Patent Law 
1. Utility Patents Basics 
Utility patents are awarded to anyone who invents a new and useful process, 
method, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.27 The claimed inven-
tion must be novel28 and non-obvious,29 and it must comply with the statutory 
requirements for the patent specification.30  
A patent gives the inventor the right to exclude others from making or using 
the claimed invention for a period of twenty years from the filing date of the 
application for the patent; 31 after that time, the patent enters the public domain 
and the patent owner cannot sue for infringement.32 Patents have been issued 
for everything from light bulbs,33 to barcode scanners,34 and to new types of 
plastic.35 
This trade between the inventor, who gains a right to exclude others from 
making or using his invention for a limited time,36 and the general public, who 
                                                
 25 See 15 U.S.C § 1052 (2012); 17 U.S.C § 101 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 26 See Franklin & Henry, supra note 20. 
 27 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 28 See id. § 102 (the America Invents Act amended the specific requirements for novelty 
effective March 16, 2013, but still requires novelty). 
 29 See id. § 103 (the America Invents Act amended the previous Patent Act of 1952 
effective March 16, 2013, but still requires non-obviousness). 
 30 See id. § 112 (the America Invents Act amended the previous Patent Act of 1952 
effective March 16, 2013, but has similar requisites for the specification). 
 31 Id. § 154(a)(2). 
 32 See id. § 154(a)(1). The term can be adjusted, however, under the provisions of 35 
U.S.C. § 154(b). Id. §154(b). 
 33 US Patent No. 223,898 (filed 1880). 
 34 US Patent No. 6,119,939 (filed 1998). 
 35 US Patent No, 8,349,924 (filed 2010). 
 36 See § 154(a)(2) (providing the limited timeframe of twenty years from the date of 
filing the application for the patent). 
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gains the new technical knowledge disclosed in the patent by the inventor, is at 
the heart of the United States patent system.37 Because of this goal, utility pa-
tents are only given to functional designs that increase the technical knowledge 
available to the public.38 For example, once Edison’s light bulb patent expired, 
anyone could use the technology that was disclosed in the patent.39 Any patent 
that seeks only to protect a purely ornamental design is invalid.40 Design pa-
tents, however, were created to protect ornamental designs that are not eligible 
for utility patent protection.41 
2. Design Patents and Recent Changes in Their Law 
An applicant for a design patent must claim a new and original ornamental 
design.42 For example, the famous Coke bottle design received design patent 
protection.43 The object itself may provide some utility, but the functional ele-
ments must be construed out of the claimed design in order to determine any 
infringement.44 Finding a “visual similarity” between the plaintiff’s patented 
design and the defendant’s accused infringing design is a key step in the in-
fringement analysis.45 As a result, some consider design patents an alternative 
way to protect designs that cannot be trademarked.46 
Recently, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. changed the standard of 
proving design patent infringement.47 The case involved a dispute over whether 
                                                
 37 See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patents are Property: A Fundamental But Important 
Concept, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 87, 93 (2009) (“Absent the ability to assert patent property 
rights, fewer inventions will be patented and the public storehouse of knowledge will de-
crease without the public disclosure from those patents.”). 
 38 Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2010), see 35 
U.S.C. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (requiring a new and useful invention). 
 39 See § 154(a)(2) (providing that twenty years from the date of filing the application for 
the patent, it would expire and enter the public domain). 
 40 Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1293-94. 
 41 Id. 
 42 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012). 
 43 See US Patent No. D48,160 (filed 1915). 
 44 See OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(“Where a design contains both functional and non-functional elements, the scope of the 
claim must be construed in order to identify the non-functional aspects of the design as 
shown in the patent.”). 
 45 Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The patented 
and accused designs are compared for overall visual similarity.”). 
 46 Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of American Design Patent Protec-
tion, 88 IND. L.J. 837, 844 (2013). 
 47 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. 543 F.3d 655, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting 
the “point of novelty” and “non-trivial advance” tests and adopting the “ordinary observer” 
test as the sole test for whether a design patent has been infringed). 
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the defendant had infringed the design of the plaintiff’s nail buffer, which was 
disclosed in a design patent.48 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
rejected the old “point of novelty test,”49 holding that the “ordinary observer 
test” is the proper test for design patent infringement.50 This test considers an 
ordinary observer who is familiar with prior art designs and decides whether 
that observer would be deceived by the accused infringing design.51 This deci-
sion and the move to the ordinary observer test were widely seen as making it 
easier to prove design patent infringement.52  
B. United States Copyright Law Fundamentals 
Copyright protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the 
aid of a machine or device.”53 These works can include literary works, musical 
works, dramatic works or graphical works.54 Like patents, copyrights expire 
after a certain span of time. Usually, this time period is seventy years after the 
author’s death for works published after January 1, 1978.55 Also like patent 
law, copyright law seeks to give the creator of the copyrighted work rights to 
his or her work for a set time period, until the work passes to the public domain 
and becomes freely available.56 
Courts have held that computerized works stored on the Read Only Memory 
(ROM) of a computer are protectable by copyright.57 Copyright protection does 
not extend to any process, system, or other similar functional thing that embod-
ies the copyrighted work.58 However, courts have held that copyright protection 
                                                
 48 Id. at 668. 
 49 See id. at 670-71 (the “point of novelty test” requires the plaintiff who is alleging 
infringement to point out the novelty in the design that the defendant allegedly copied). 
 50 See id. at 676 (adopting the “ordinary observer” test, in which the ordinary observer 
is assumed to notice the minor differences between the patented design and the alleged in-
fringing design). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Gene Quinn, Google Granted Design Patent on Search Webpage, IP WATCHDOG 
(Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/09/03/google-granted-design-patent-on-
search-webpage/id=5512/. 
 53 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. § 302(a). 
 56 See id. § 302(e). 
 57 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 
1983). 
 58 § 102(b). 
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extends to source code for computer programs and operating systems.59 
C. Trademarks in the United States  
1. Traditional Trademarks and Basic Governing Law  
The Lanham Act defines a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or de-
vice, or any combination thereof…to identify and distinguish… goods, includ-
ing a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indi-
cate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”60 Trademarks 
have no value of their own; they only represent the goodwill of the business 
they are associated with and not words or use of words.61 The marks only give 
its owner the right to protect the goodwill of the business from others.62  
Trademarks generally fall into one of four categories that form a continuum: 
generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary/fanciful.63 Each category has 
different requirements for trademark protection; some marks receive automatic 
protection, while other marks cannot be protected at all.64 
Generic marks describe a general class of goods, rather than specific 
goods.65 Examples of generic marks include “car” or “chair.” In the case of 
“car,” giving Toyota exclusive use over the word would severely harm other 
carmakers like Ford or General Motors. This is because generic marks fail to 
function as trademarks as required by law. Under the car example, no consum-
er exclusively associates the word “car” with Toyota, or any specific carmaker 
for that matter. In other words, generic marks are not source-identifying, and 
they do not distinguish the product from other similar products.66 Generic 
marks, therefore, cannot be protected or registered.67 
Descriptive marks describe something about the good, such as a characteris-
tic or ingredient.68 An example of a descriptive mark is “Holiday Inn” or “All 
                                                
 59 Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249; see also discussion infra Section III, B, 2. 
 60 15 U.S.C. 1127 (2012). 
 61 See Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 62 Prestonettes, Inc., v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924). 
 63 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 64 Compare “generic marks” in Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 
322-323 (1871) (holding that  “Lackawanna coal” was not a phrase that could be trade-
marked), with “suggestive marks” in Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 
295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (granting patent to “CON-TACT” for self-adhesive 
decorating plastics). 
 65 See Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 66 See Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ’g, 364 F.3d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 
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Bran.” “Holiday Inn” is descriptive because the hotel chain is the “inn” where 
travelers stay while on vacation or “holiday.”69 Marks that are “merely descrip-
tive” cannot be registered, because they are not inherently distinctive.70 A mark 
that consumers perceive as coming from one source is distinctive,71 i.e. the 
mark “has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce,” and may 
be protected or registered.72 “Holiday Inn” has acquired distinctiveness, be-
cause when an individual states,  “I’m staying at the Holiday Inn in Washing-
ton, D.C.,” most consumers would recognize this name as the well-known na-
tional hotel chain. 
Distinctiveness73 for descriptive marks is shown if the mark has a secondary 
meaning. 74  Factors that demonstrate secondary meaning and thus source-
identification,75 include consumer testimony and surveys, how long the trade-
mark has been used, advertising, and sales volume.76 While all of these factors 
are important to a secondary meaning analysis, customer surveys are the most 
effective at demonstrating source-identification and essential to showing sec-
ondary meaning.77 
Suggestive marks are those that require imagination on the part of the con-
sumer to understand the nature of the goods.78 Examples of suggestive marks 
include “Tide” or “Blu-Ray.”79 For example, “Tide” does not immediately con-
jure up notions of doing laundry, but after thinking and imagining, the term 
may evoke feelings of freshness and cleanliness that are associated with water 
                                                                                                             
1977). 
 69 Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc. 476 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 70 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). 
 71 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION  U.S. 763, 7 
 72 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012). 
 73 Distinctiveness can either be inherent or acquired. See the discussion infra at 10 for 
an explanation of inherent distinctiveness. Acquired distinctiveness, or secondary meaning, 
is an additional meaning that consumers associate with the good or service, and when that 
occurs, the mark becomes source-identifying. This is called “secondary,” since this new 
meaning attaches after the descriptive mark is created. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15:1 (4th ed. 1996). 
 74 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION  ACQUIRED 7. 
 75 See Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254 U.S. 143, 146 (1920) (describing the 
acquisition of secondary meaning of Coca-Cola, from the Coca leaf and Cola nut, to the 
soda). 
 76 Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 393 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 77 See, e.g., J & J Snack Foods, Corp. v. Earthgrains Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 358, 368 
(D.N.J. 2002) (permitting survey evidence in a trademark case), see, e.g., Commerce Nat. 
Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) (allowing 
customer satisfaction survey to be used as evidence in trademark litigation). 
 78 Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 79 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc. 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000). 
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and the sea.80 Suggestive marks are therefore inherently distinctive,81 so they 
may be registered without proving secondary meaning.82 As a result, determin-
ing whether or not a trademark is descriptive or suggestive is one of the most-
contested areas in trademark litigation.83 
Arbitrary or fanciful is the final classification of trademark.84 Arbitrary 
marks take a word or symbol and use it in an arbitrary manner with respect to 
the product, so that it does not describe or suggest the product.85 Fanciful 
marks create a new word or mark to associate with the product or service. Ex-
amples of this include “Apple” (applied to computers and other technological 
products) or “Exxon” (applied to petrochemicals). “Apple” is an arbitrary 
mark, since the word “apple” existed prior to the mark, but it is now being used 
to name a technology company in an arbitrary way. “Exxon” is fanciful: the 
word did not exist before the oil company created the word as its company 
name.86 Like suggestive marks, arbitrary marks are automatically entitled to 
trademark protection, because they are also inherently distinctive.87 Arbitrary 
or fanciful marks avoid the commonly contested descriptive/suggestive distinc-
tion.88 
These four categories together form a “spectrum” of trademark classifica-
tions. The spectrum of trademarks range from generic marks, which provide 
the least protection, to fanciful marks, which provide the greatest protection.89  
Marks tending toward the suggestive or arbitrary end of the spectrum are in-
herently strong and, thus, more likely to survive a challenge in court.90 Con-
versely, protecting a descriptive mark is more difficult because one must show 
secondary meaning.91 
One common issue that arises in trademark litigation is whether or not color 
                                                
 80 See id. at 212. 
 81 Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 385 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 82 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 83 See B. Brett Heavner and Marcus H.H. Luepke, Avoiding Trademark Pitfalls in the 
“Land of the Unlimited Possibilites”, FINNEGAN (July-Aug. 2008), 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=72244da2-f0ae-432f-
80a8-2f88a8b2bd0c  (determining whether a mark is suggestive or descriptive requires pre-
cise evaluation and objective judgment). 
 84 See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9. 
 85 MCCARTHY, supra note 73, § 11:4. 
 86 See EXXON, Registration No. 922,511. 
 87 See, e.g., Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 385 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 88 See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11. 
 89 See Public Service Co. of New Mexico v. Nexus Energy Software, Inc., 36 F.Supp. 
436, 438 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 90 Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 605 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 91 Perfect Pearl Co., Inc. v. Majestic Pearl & Stone, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 519 (S.D.N.Y 
2012). 
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can be a trademark. Classifying color somewhere on the trademark spectrum 
can be difficult.92 The Supreme Court tackled this issue in  Qualitex Co. v. Ja-
cobson Products Co., Inc.93 The plaintiff Qualitex had registered the green-
gold color of its dry cleaning pads as a trademark, and the defendant Jacobson 
began using a similar color in its pads.94 Jacobson argued there are special rea-
sons why the law should forbid the use of color alone as a trademark; for in-
stance, if the law were to permit color as a trademark, Jacobson argues that 
such a result would “produce uncertainty and unresolvable court disputes about 
what shades of a color a competitor may lawfully use.”95  
The Court rejected Jacobson’s arguments, finding no reason why color alone 
could not be protectable as a trademark, so long as that particular color ac-
quired secondary meaning.96 A product feature such as color is functional if it 
is either essential to the product’s use or if it somehow affects the product’s 
cost or quality.97 Colors can meet the requirements of trademarks.98 In this case, 
the dry cleaning pad falls into the arbitrary category. There is no competitive 
reason why a dry cleaning pad should be green-gold, and the color performs no 
significant function.99 
Qualitex illustrates the large range of objects and designs that can be pro-
tected by a trademark. If something identifies its source and is not functional, 
trademark protection is possible.100 These ideas provide the foundation for a 
special type of trademark protection: trade dress. 
2. Trade Dress: A Special Form of Trademark 
Trademark protection can extend not only to words or logos, but to other ob-
jects related to a product’s source. Trade dress is a special type of trademark 
“that originally included only the packaging, or dressing, of a product.”101 
However, that definition has expanded over the years to include product design 
as well.102 This enlarged definition now encompasses “the total image of a 
                                                
 92 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 160-61, 166 (1995). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 161. 
 95 Id. at 166-67. 
 96 Id. at 163. 
 97 Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982). 
 98 Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 166. 
 99 Id. at 166 (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., No. CV 90 1183 
HLH(JRX), 1991 WL 318798, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 1991)). 
 100 Inwood Labs, 456 U.S. at 850-51 nn.10-11. 
 101 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000) (internal quo-
tations omitted). 
 102 Id. 
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product and may include features such as size, shape, color or color combina-
tions, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”103 Under this new 
definition, trade dress protection has been extended to greeting cards, maga-
zine covers, a bathroom scale, and a variety of other products.104 However, this 
expansion led to problems in defining the alleged trade dress.105 
 A valid trade dress infringement claim contains three elements: the trade 
dress is distinctive and identifies its source, there is a likelihood of confusion 
between the plaintiff’s trade dress and the defendant’s alleged infringing dress, 
and the trade dress is not functional.106 Because trade dress protection has the 
potential to severely limit other businesses in a particular area, courts have re-
quired plaintiffs to assert a “concrete expression” of their trade dress.107 Overly 
broad trade dress claims can effectively exclude others from using common 
design elements, and such an exclusion would put competitors at a non-
reputation based disadvantage.108 
Like other trademarks, distinctiveness in trade dress may be shown in one of 
two ways: either the trade dress is inherently distinctive109 or it has acquired 
secondary meaning.110 Essentially, a plaintiff must show that his or her trade 
dress is either arbitrary/fanciful or suggestive in order to show inherent distinc-
tiveness, or that customers have come to associate the descriptive trade dress 
with that plaintiff, i.e. that the dress has secondary meaning and acquired dis-
tinctiveness.111 
Following from the idea that trade dress must not put the competition at a 
non-reputation based disadvantage comes the requirement that trade dress can-
not protect a functional design.112 Giving one company the exclusive right to a 
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 104 Melus, Gregory J., Trade Dress 2.0: Trademark Protects in Web Design What Copy-
right Does Not, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N. (forthcoming summer 2014) (discuss-
ing Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533 (D. Co. 1986) (greeting 
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functional design is the scope of patent law, not trademarks.113 Trademarks 
should only identify the source of the goods or service to the consumer and not 
preclude competitors the right to use a functional design they would otherwise 
have the right to use.114  
The so-called Morton-Norwich factors are useful in determining whether or 
not the design is functional.115 The factors arose from In Re Morton-Norwich 
Products, Inc., a case in which the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) denied registering a trademark for the design of a spray bottle for 
cleaning products.116 The attorney examining the trademark held that the design 
of the bottle was functional.117 In reviewing the USPTO’s decision, the United 
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals considered four factors: the exist-
ence of utility patents which disclose the design,118 the existence of advertising 
touting the design,119 the existence of alternatives,120 and the costs of manufac-
ture.121  
The reasoning behind these factors is relatively straightforward. Because 
utility patents are only awarded for devices or methods that serve a useful pur-
pose,122 functionality is inherent to them. Advertisements that tout the design 
would suggest that the manufacturer of the alleged functional design also con-
siders that design functional.123 A design that severely reduces the number of 
alternatives or increases costs of manufacture is likely using something that is 
important to the design of the device, and therefore, the design element is not 
merely indicative of the designer’s goodwill.124 Giving a manufacturer an effec-
tive monopoly on a design would unfairly disadvantage the trademark owner’s 
competitors. Furthermore, trademarks and trade dress protection can extend 
indefinitely, so long as they are used in commerce,125 whereas patent and copy-
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right protection expire after a set period of time.126 Extending trade dress pro-
tection to a functional design would undermine the goals of patent law. 
The mere fact that something can be made in alternative ways does not au-
tomatically render the contested design non-functional.127 Moreover, the exist-
ence of only a few workable alternatives strongly implies a functional de-
sign.128 Such a situation leads to the fourth factor of cost, by requiring a com-
petitor to design a new and potentially less useful design to avoid trade dress 
infringement even though such a design is not patented.129 The Restatement of 
Unfair Competition has stated the functional doctrine thusly:  
[a] design is ‘functional’ . . . if the design affords benefits in the manufacturing, mar-
keting, or use of the goods or services with which the design is used, apart from any 
benefits attributable to the design’s significance as an indication of source, that are 
important to effective competition by others and that are not practically available 
through the use of alternative designs.130  
One example that illustrates this concept is the case Brunswick Corp. v. Brit-
ish Seagull Ltd., where the plaintiff, a manufacturer of outboard motors, sought 
to register the color black for outboard motors as its trade dress.131 The USPTO 
and the court both found the use of that color was functional, even though it 
did not make the motor function better.132 Rather, the court and the USPTO 
found the use of the color black was a “competitive need” in the outboard mo-
tor industry, because many other outboard motor manufacturers use black for 
many different reasons. For example, black “goes well” with most boat colors, 
allowing it to be used on many more boats than a different colored motor 
would, and it makes the motor look smaller.133 
Functional designs have benefits apart from any source identification and 
these benefits can be in the use of the design. Restricting use of these function-
al designs reduces the number of alternatives and unfairly inhibits competition. 
The seminal case for trade dress is Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. Ta-
co Cabana operated a chain of Mexican restaurants that featured a unique 
combination of vivid colors, murals, and paintings to create a festive atmos-
                                                                                                             
protection is potentially perpetual in duration.”). 
 126 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (patent term); see also 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012) (copyright 
term). 
 127 See Application of Honeywell, Inc., 532 F.2d 180, 182 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (finding that 
the existence of alternative thermostat designs does not “detract from the functional charac-
ter” of the design). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Brunswick Corp., 35 F.3d at 1531. 
 130 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995). 
 131 Brunswick Corp., 35 F.3d at 1529. 
 132 Id. at 1531. 
 133 Id. 
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phere for patrons.134 Shortly thereafter, Two Pesos built restaurants with similar 
designs and colors.135 Taco Cabana sued for trade dress infringement, and Two 
Pesos argued that Taco Cabana had not shown secondary meaning.136 
The Supreme Court rejected Two Pesos’ argument, finding that Taco Caba-
na’s restaurant design was not descriptive but inherently distinctive.137 Like 
suggestive or arbitrary marks, inherently distinctive marks do not require proof 
of secondary meaning.138 Since the district court found that the trade dress was 
nonfunctional and inherently distinctive,139 any further finding of secondary 
meaning was unnecessary.140 
Two Pesos is important since it provides guidance for product designers who 
seek protection for the product’s design. The designer must create a nonfunc-
tional and inherently distinctive design, i.e. one that is suggestive or arbi-
trary/fanciful. Once such a design is created, it will no longer be necessary to 
prove secondary meaning, since adding that further requirement would have 
anticompetitive effects on the market.141  
III. PROTECTING WEBSITE DESIGN WITHIN CURRENT 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
 With the Internet occupying such an important place in modern society, 
websites and web design are important aspects of how companies, govern-
ments, other organizations and individuals present themselves to the public.142 
With the stakes so high, protecting websites within existing intellectual proper-
ty law presents a unique challenge to site owners and designers.143 Before dis-
cussing how different forms of intellectual property might apply to websites, 
gaining a basic understanding of websites and their components is useful. 
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A. Website Basics and Common Web Design Principles 
A website is a “group of connected pages on the World Wide Web contain-
ing information on a particular subject.”144 The World Wide Web sends pages 
in Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) over the Internet, where web brows-
ers, such as Google Chrome or Mozilla Firefox, read and interpret the HTML 
code to show the site to the user.145 Encoded within the HTML are common 
features of websites, such as formatted text, graphics, search bars, hyperlinks 
and audio.146 These features and others combine to form what users see after 
they type the web address into their web browser.147 
Websites, generally speaking, are a form of graphical user interface (GUI).148 
GUIs are a human-computer interface where the human manipulates items on 
the computer screen with the mouse or keyboard.149   GUIs and websites 
“use…typography, symbols, color, and other static and dynamic graphics … to 
convey facts, concepts and emotions.”150 Several design concepts are used by 
web designers to organize and communicate information to the user.151 These 
concepts include consistency, screen layout, relationships between items, navi-
gability, simplicity, clarity, distinctiveness, emphasis, readability,152 and aes-
thetics.153 
Consistency requires internal uniformity throughout the website, as well as 
external uniformity, which requires a web designer to use existing conven-
tions.154 For example, the design of the mouse cursor has been used for dec-
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ades, and departing from this convention would likely confuse users.155 
Screen layout principles seek to arrange the components on the screen in a 
clear and organized way.156 A disorganized screen layout is ineffective at di-
recting users to important material, and disorganization can confuse and frus-
trate a user, which can push that user and others away from the site.157 For ex-
ample, a layout using a grid or other similarly organized grouping allows a 
user to quickly read through all options or content before choosing where to go 
next. 
Emphasizing and linking relationships between closely related items while 
disassociating unrelated items furthers the goal of good organization.158 Use of 
objects like a grid are an effective way to convey related information easily to 
a site’s user.159 Furthermore, such an organization achieves the functional end 
of directing the user to important areas of the site.160 
Navigability synthesizes these concepts together, seeking to grab the user’s 
focus when he or she initially reaches the site. After the user has arrived, he or 
she is then navigated to important information on the site, as well as less im-
portant areas.161 All these concepts together seek to enhance and facilitate the 
user’s experience on the site and to ensure the user finds the information and 
content that he or she is seeking within the website.162 
Underlying all these design elements is the function of the website. Clarity, 
for example, should communicate function and meaning so as to aid interac-
tion with the website.163 A website that has navigability or layout issues is less 
functional than one where navigation is obvious and intuitive.164 Moreover, 
even something seemingly nonfunctional like aesthetics should “reinforce 
function.”165 The choice of color, an aesthetic choice in most situations, can 
have strong functional characteristics in a website.166 A different color could 
highlight a changed object, denote the currently open tab, mark different lists, 
allow a user to customize the site to her preferences, or display site feedback 
clearly and effectively.167 
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For example, the Google search page incorporates many of these ele-
ments.168 The page is simple, and the search bar is in the middle of the page, 
making it absolutely clear where a user is to type the search query.169 There is 
very little else on the page, making the site easy to navigate.170 When the list of 
results is displayed, previously visited links are denoted with purple text, and 
sites that have not been visited are displayed with blue text.171 This use of color 
helps the user remember what sites have already been visited, so the user does 
not revisit the same site again while searching. All these design elements rein-
force the function of web searching.172 
Most everything on a website is integrated into the site’s function.173 This 
permeates the entirety of the site itself — “correct execution and integration of 
all facets of the site will outweigh the value of a single component.”174 Even a 
beginner’s site on web design emphasizes the relationship between form and 
function from the very beginning: “Rule: Make sure the visual form of a site 
relates to its function.”175 It is nearly impossible to separate a website’s  design 
from its  function.176 
B. Intellectual Property Protection for Websites  
1. Patents and Utility Patents Offer Levels of Protection for Websites  
a. Utility Patents May Protect Functional Software Methods 
A website owner may gain patent protection for the functional aspects of his 
website, provided these are patentable subject matter,177 useful,178 novel,179 non-
obvious180 and meet the statutory requirements of the patent specification.181 
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However, such an endeavor leads the site owner into the complex realm of 
software patents. Methods generally are patentable subject matter,182 and soft-
ware is patented as a method of performing some operations on a computer-
readable medium.183 Software patents are controversial, but they still remain a 
valid form of intellectual property protection.184 However, software patents 
have been increasingly subject to more restrictions on their scope.185 In Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank International, the Supreme Court held that abstract ideas 
implemented on a computer do not translate into a patentable invention.186 
What exactly this means for software patents as a whole remains to be seen, as 
now more than ever software patents are subject to restrictions that are not ful-
ly defined.187 This uncertainty presents problems for those seeking to protect 
their intellectual property. 
b. Design Patents are a Potential Alternative 
 The Egyptian Goddess case changed the standard for proving design 
patent infringement. Some viewed this decision as a victory for design patent 
owners and a more economical cause of action for website owners.188 In fact, 
not long after the Egyptian Goddess decision, Google obtained a design patent 
for its search website.189 
 Design patents, which require new and novel designs, could be used to 
protect the overall look and feel of a website.190 When courts determine the 
merits of a design patent infringement claim, they evaluate all aspects of the 
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claimed design. In other words, the construction of the design patent claim 
avoids the functionality limits on trademarks and trade dress.191 In fact, some 
courts have suggested this path for other aspiring trademark owners.192 With 
software patents in a state of flux,193 design patents for websites are a promis-
ing alternative.194 
2. Copyright Protects Purely Artistic Elements 
 Artistic works like graphics, music, or literary works may be protected 
by copyright.195 Some courts view “literary works” to include the source code 
of computer programs and websites.196 That protection also extends to all ex-
pression embodied in the computer.197 
 However, copyright protection of the source code is rather limited.198 To 
make a valid copyright infringement claim, plaintiffs must show that they own 
the copyright and that the copyright work was imitated.199 While seemingly 
straightforward for works like books or songs, it can cause problems for com-
puter code.200 To establish the second element of infringement, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant copied the work and that copying rendered the 
works substantially similar.201 This second prong is significant for computer 
code, because two different sets of code can create a program or website that 
look identical to the original and can perform the same functions.202 In other 
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words, copyright only protects the code, not the end result of the code. There-
fore, in order to avoid a copyright infringement claim, a potential infringer 
would just need to write different source code that produces the same end re-
sult. For this reason, some website owners have sought trade dress protection 
in order to safeguard their sites. 
3. Attempts to Apply Trade Dress to Websites 
In recent years website owners and legal commentators have attempted to 
apply the principles of trade dress to websites.203 Because trade tress was creat-
ed to protect tangible items, applying this legal theory to abstract objects such 
as websites is a difficult endeavor. 
a. The Blue Nile Case 
Because website trade dress is a relatively new legal theory, there is sparse 
case law to support it.204 Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc. was one of the first cas-
es to allow a website trade dress claim to survive a defendant’s motion to dis-
miss. In that case, the plaintiff, Blue Nile, owned several jewelry websites.205 
The defendant, Ice.com, also sold jewelry through its own separate website, 
which allegedly had a very similar look and feel to Blue Nile’s site.206 In its 
complaint, Blue Nile alleged both copyright infringement207 and trade dress 
infringement.208 Ice moved to dismiss, and posited a trade dress claim under the 
Lanham Act.209 
When considering the motion to dismiss, the court reasoned that more facts 
were needed when a “novel legal theory” like this was being put forth by the 
plaintiff.210 The court did not give further guidance as to the factual develop-
ment necessary to assert a successful trade dress claim,211 and the case was later 
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settled out of court before any additional facts could be discovered.212 
b. Legal Scholars Have Considered the Issue in More Depth 
Legal commentators have also studied this issue; in fact, the current litera-
ture mostly reflects work from legal scholars rather than decided cases or judi-
cial opinions. However, most articles focus on different issues, e.g. the copy-
right/trade dress distinction213 or distinctiveness.214 Functionality is discussed in 
passing, if at all.215 
When scholars discuss functionality, it is cast off as a hurdle to trade dress 
protection for Web sites in one of two ways.216 Either commentators note that 
there are so many alternatives that giving trade dress protection to only one 
would not substantially reduce the number of available designs,217 or authors 
rely on cases that advocate for a holistic analysis of the alleged trade dress, 
rather than the individual parts.218 Thus, the court’s aim is to foster competition 
when considering whether functionality is a hurdle to trade dress protection.219 
These views regarding functionality are misguided, since Web sites are more 
than just a collection of functional elements, and the number of alternatives is 
not as large as most commentators seem to believe. When analyzed thorough-
ly, Web sites fail to meet the nonfunctional requirements of trade dress.  
IV. THE CONFERENCE ARCHIVES CASE AND THE COURT’S OPINION 
REGARDING WEBSITE TRADE DRESS 
Conference Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, Inc. is one of the first cases to 
discuss the complex concept of website trade dress protection. The plaintiff, 
Conference Archives, produced a teleconferencing software that allowed users 
to stream live video online. The defendant, Sound Images, allegedly violated a 
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non-disclosure agreement it had signed with the plaintiff and recreated Confer-
ence Archives’ site.220 
Conference Archives moved for summary judgment on the violation of the 
non-disclosure agreement and violation of intellectual property in its Web 
site.221 However, the motion contained a “nebulous” discussion of the grounds 
on which Conference Archives had relied to support its claim.222 The court then 
evaluated the various potential theories, eventually discussing trade dress pro-
tection for Web sites.223 This case was one of the first to analyze what is re-
quired, to support a trade dress claim for a Web site, noting three elements of a 
Web site’s “look and feel”: color, orientation and code elements.224 
For the element of color, the court discussed how colors are denoted in Web 
sites.225 Web sites use hexadecimal notation to identify over 16,777,216 unique 
colors.226 Every color can be made as a mixture of red, green and blue, the pri-
mary colors of light and computer displays.227 A value ranging from zero to 
256 is assigned to each color, and these values are interpreted by a computer to 
obtain the desired color.228 For example, to give a grayish-blue color, red is 
given a value of 36, green a value of 104 and blue a value of 160.229 This three-
number coding scheme allows web designers to distinguish colors with a great 
deal of precision.230 
The court’s orientation element considers the placement of the Web site’s 
content within the computer screen.231 The two-dimensional array of pixels that 
form a computer screen form a coordinate system that allows a Web site de-
signer to place Web site components on the screen.232 For example, a web de-
signer can place an image or other web object ten pixels from the top of the 
page and fifty pixels from the left of the page.233 Like color, the coordinate sys-
tem allows a web designer to place objects on the Web site very precisely, 
down to the specific pixel on the computer screen.234 
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The final element of the court’s test was Web site coding.235 Web sites use 
HTML “tags” to instruct the computer’s web browser what type of object 
should be displayed on the screen and what features it should have.236 These 
objects may include headings, images, paragraphs or links.237 The court found 
that “the manner in which the code and tags are arranged directly impact how 
the page looks and feels.”238 
The court then explored just what constitutes the “look and feel” of a web-
site.239 Look and feel were two different elements of the Web site in the court’s 
opinion. The “look” includes colors, shapes, layouts, typecases, and shapes in 
the Web site itself,240 while the “feel” includes buttons, boxes, menus, and hy-
perlinks, which help the user navigate the page.241 These create two “critical 
layers” of a website: the visual design and interface design, which define the 
look and feel of the site.242 
The court’s discussion of functionality focused on color and the existence of 
alternatives.243 Specifically, the court noted that “the Supreme Court has held 
that color is not functional and does not provide a competitive advantage be-
cause any color can be used to accomplish a certain functionality.”244 The court 
also concluded that many alternative designs to websites exist, and are not 
covered by the trade dress claim, and therefore, that the interface should not be 
considered functional.245  
V. CONFERENCE ARCHIVES WAS WRONGLY DECIDED AND LEGAL 
SCHOLARS HAVE NOT CORRECTLY CONSIDERED WEBSITE 
FUNCTIONALITY  
The court in Conference Archives and the legal commentators have not cor-
rectly considered functionality in the context of websites. They have misap-
plied the functional standard, the number of alternatives test, the “as a whole” 
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test, and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, Inc.246 Ar-
guments supporting the nonfunctional nature of websites fail because websites 
are different than anything before considered for trade dress protection; they 
are a collection of functional components and joined to make a functional 
whole.247 They are a visual medium, and users actively interact with that medi-
um when they visit the site. Websites are inherently functional, so trade dress 
is not a viable form of intellectual property protection for websites. 
A. Website Trade Dress When Viewed Through Two Pesos 
Some have attempted to avoid the functional issues of websites by looking 
to the Two Pesos case, where the Supreme Court found that the design of a 
restaurant could be protectable trade dress.248 The proponents of this theory 
argue that the color, orientation and other design elements of a website are 
analogous to the “vivid color scheme,” “bright awnings,” and “paintings and 
murals” in Two Pesos.249 However, this analogy is faulty; the colors, awnings 
and artwork in the restaurant at issue in Two Pesos are significantly less func-
tional than similar components in a website. 
A customer at the Two Pesos restaurant can only look at the colors, awnings 
and artwork; it is a passive experience.250  A user of a website is actively en-
gaged in the website.251 Pictures often are clicked to lead to other pages on the 
site.252 The colors are used to make the site visually pleasing, and more im-
portantly, to direct the user’s attention to important parts of the site and to con-
vey the site’s information and content to the user actively.253 Colors of previ-
ously visited links change color to help the user remember what links they 
have already visited.254 These parts of a site are not just “dressing” as their ana-
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logues were in Two Pesos; these parts individually perform some function, and 
they all join together to make the site functional.255 
For example, if one of the awnings or pictures in the Two Pesos restaurant 
was missing, customers would still be able to order food and eat. Those dress-
ing elements do not affect the business’s function, selling food to its custom-
ers. Contrast that situation with a website. If links on a website are broken, the 
site no longer functions. Users are unable to access parts of the site or the us-
er’s browser reports an error and fails to load the site at all. The components 
and form of a site are so tied to the site’s function that very often problems in 
one portion prevent the entire site from working properly.  
B. The Number of Alternative Designs for a Website is Smaller Than 
Appearances Suggest 
Other supporters of website trade dress look to the number of alternatives 
available to designers. Supporters of this line of reasoning state that because 
there are many ways to design a website, giving one site rights over its design 
does not give that particular site an unfair advantage.256 However, this justifica-
tion for site dress confuses the “number of alternatives” with “number of usa-
ble alternatives.” In addition, the mere existence of alternatives does not pre-
clude a finding of functionality.257 
There are certainly thousands of ways to design a website, but there is a lim-
ited realm of usable and effective designs. A good analogy is the number of 
poker hands (e.g. two-pair, straight, three-of-a-kind) compared to the number 
of possible hands. The usable site designs are as important to web designers as 
good hands are to poker players. Giving only one poker player exclusive right 
to a three-of-a-kind would give that player a large and unfair advantage. Simi-
larly, giving one web designer exclusive use over black letters on a white 
background would give that designer an unfair advantage. Another designer 
surely could design a website with yellow letters on a white background, but 
the tenants of design lead him to avoid such a design, because the user of that 
site would find the letters very difficult to see and read. There are many possi-
bilities available to a web designer, but the principles of good interface design 
place strong limitations on those alternatives.258  There are even “industry 
                                                                                                             
common problem in website design). 
 255 Two Pesos Inc., 505 U.S. at 765. 
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standards” that place further limitations on website design.259  
Design principles and industry standards inherently reduce the number of al-
ternatives,260 so the “number of alternatives” argument is a mathematical argu-
ment at its core.261 If the number of design choices is so limited, then the num-
ber of alternative ways the site may be arranged is drastically reduced as well. 
Poor design harms websites because it leads potential users away from the 
site.262 Forcing competitors to use other designs would put those competitors at 
a non-reputation based disadvantage that trademark law seeks to avoid.263 
Moreover, the “as a whole” argument is substantially weakened in view of 
the proper application of the alternatives argument. This holistic argument, that 
trade dress must be considered as a whole, cannot be applied to websites. The 
proper test is not “whether individual elements of the trade dress fall within the 
definition of functional, but to whether the whole collection of elements taken 
together are functional.”264 This is a very important distinction, and it is the 
case with websites. All parts of the website aid the user to interact with the site 
and direct that user to where he or she wants to go.265 If one concedes that the 
individual components of a website are “functional,” precepts of website de-
sign indicate that the whole of such parts must be “functional” as well.266 
Therefore, the holistic argument also fails. Even when considered as a whole, 
websites are still functional.  
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C. Web Design is Not Arbitrary 
Courts have looked to whether the purported design as a whole is arbitrary 
and nonfunctional, as well as whether the design limits the number of alterna-
tive designs when assessing trade dress claims.267 As discussed above, the 
number of alternatives is not applicable to websites. Design principles severely 
limit the number of alternatives, and competitors who are excluded from using 
certain design elements by a trade dress claim are placed at a non-reputation 
based disadvantage.268 
The design of websites is not arbitrary, either. In the process of website 
creation, web designers constantly make decisions about functionality. 269 
Throughout this process, they employ key concepts like consistency, navigabil-
ity, simplicity or clarity, which combine to make the site function.270 Websites 
are a collection of functional elements, but in combination, the elements form a 
functional whole that cannot be protected by trade dress.271 
D. The Conference Archives Court’s Reasoning Was Flawed 
Applying the reasoning of legal commentators and other courts, the court in 
Conference Archives determined whether trade dress law applies to websites. 
The court’s reasoning treated the look and feel of a website separately.272 The 
“look” was defined as the “graphic treatment or interface elements,” while the 
“feel” was the “dynamic navigation elements, including buttons, boxes, menus 
and hyperlinks.”273 The court reasoned that these elements together form a pro-
tectable trade dress that creates “a graphical user interface that promotes the 
intuitive use of the web site.”274 
The court dismissed website functionality by using the number of alterna-
tives argument, the holistic argument, and two other key points. First, the court 
stated that “a web site may be protectable as trade dress if the site as a whole 
identifies its owner as the creator or product source.”275 Second, “the look and 
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feel of a page might be functional if it made viewing the site owner’s goods 
more efficient or facilitated the placing of orders on the owner’s site,”276 but so 
long as there are alternatives, the site should not be considered functional.277 
The first of these arguments merely recites the “secondary meaning” re-
quirement of descriptive trademarks.278 However, the presence of secondary 
meaning does not negate the non-functional element of trademark protection, 
nor does secondary meaning necessarily require that the object possessing that 
meaning be non-functional.279 The three factors of a trade dress claim must be 
considered independently; the non-functional element is independent of sec-
ondary meaning or source identification.280 An analysis of secondary meaning 
happens independently of the functionality analysis, and vice versa.281 
The court’s second argument, which alleges that a site can be functional in a 
limited sense, again relies on the faulty “number of alternatives” argument to 
avoid a finding of functionality. However, the court’s seemingly narrow con-
cession of functionality is in fact a broad admission when viewed through the 
concepts and established principles of website design.282  
Essentially, the court’s argument boils down to efficiency and facilitation.283 
These concepts are at the core of good interface design.284 Objectives like con-
sistency, screen layout, relationships between items, navigability, simplicity, 
clarity, distinctiveness, emphasis and readability285 each play a role to make a 
site more efficient and to facilitate the purpose of the site.286 For example, a 
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proper screen layout combined with simple relationships between items would 
assist the user in finding the most important links on the site quickly and effi-
ciently. This is an important goal for all websites and web designers. Any site, 
be it sports, blogs, weather forecasts, streaming video, banking, or anything in 
between wants to facilitate the user finding its important content efficiently.287 
This view is supported by the court’s own reference to the Restatement 
(Third of Unfair Competition).288 The Restatement of Unfair Competition states 
that a design is functional, if it 
[A]ffords benefits in the … use of the goods or services with which the design is used, 
apart from any benefits attributable to the design’s significance as an indication of 
source, that are important to effective competition by others and that are not practical-
ly available through the use of alternative designs.289    
This is the case with websites and web design.290 Giving one site exclusive 
use of design elements or industry standards is giving the site benefits apart 
from its indication of source.291 Nearly every site uses the same concepts of 
design to make the site more useable, efficient and functional.292 
The court also discusses color in the context of websites, noting that “color 
is not functional and does not provide a competitive advantage because any 
color can be used to accomplish a certain functionality.”293 This argument relies 
on the Qualitex case discussed previously, but it mischaracterizes the Supreme 
Court’s rationale. The Qualitex case concerned the coloring of dry cleaning 
pads.  The Court correctly held that they had no “obvious theoretical objection 
to the use of color alone as a trademark.”294 Contrary to the court’s statement in 
Conference Archives, in Qualitex, the Supreme Court noted that color can only 
be a trademark when it performs no “significant function.”295 
The respondent in Qualitex argued that “color depletion” was one of the 
fundamental problems with color trademarks.296 This situation arises when the 
use of color so severely reduces the number of alternative colors available to 
                                                
 287 Powell, supra note 173, at 17-19. 
 288 Conference Archives, 2010 WL 1626072 at *17, n.50. 
 289 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995). 
 290 See Jessica Goldenberg, Trade Dress Can be Viable Means of Protecting Websites 
from Competitor’s Look-Alike Sites, PROSKAUER NEW MEDIA AND TECH. L. BLOG (Nov. 7, 
2013), http://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2013/11/07/trade-dress-can-be-viable-means-of-
protecting-websites-from-competitors-look-alike-sites/ (explaining the recent holding of 
Louisiana courts position on “trade dress”). 
 291 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995). 
 292 Powell, supra note 173, at 19. 
 293 Conference Archives, 2010 WL 1626072 at *17 (discussing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)). 
 294 Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163. 
 295 Id. at 166. 
 296 Id. 
2014] COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 187 
competitors that those competitors cannot find a suitable color to use for their 
product and are placed at an unfair advantage.297 The Court did not find that 
situation to have arisen in the context of dry cleaning pads, but noted that if the 
problem did arise in the future, the “doctrine of functionality normally would 
seem available to prevent the anticompetitive consequences….”298 
This has significant implications for websites, because color is a vital part of 
site design.299 Colors in websites are used in a functional way; they “are used to 
convey facts, concepts and emotions.”300 As Qualitex contemplates, limiting 
the types of color available for websites would place others at a severe disad-
vantage.301 Therefore, the Conference Archives court erred in its decision that 
colors should be discarded as nonfunctional.  
If websites fail to meet the non-functionality element of trade dress protec-
tion, it follows that any pleading or case that advocates for such protection 
must fail as well.302 Arguments like the “number of alternatives” or the “holis-
tic” argument fail upon application to websites. Colors serve a functional pur-
pose in sites, and granting trade dress to website colors would place competi-
tors at a disadvantage. Trade dress is not a viable form of intellectual property 
protection for websites.  
VI. PROPOSAL 
Websites are inherently functional and should be barred from receiving trade 
dress protection.303 Viewing the site as a whole or looking to the number of 
alternatives does not change the fact that websites perform functions that are 
intimately connected to their design.304 The Conference Archives court and oth-
ers are incorrect for considering the possibility of website trade dress protec-
tion. Even without trade dress, site owners still have avenues available to pro-
tect their sites. These options include design patents, copyrights, and utility 
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patents. Together, these three forms of intellectual property form a strong basis 
of protection for websites. 
As previously discussed, design patents are given to novel and functional 
designs.305 This is important for websites, as any functional aspects are con-
strued out of the design.306 As a result, website owners can receive protection 
for the design aspects of the site without overreaching into functional protec-
tion and undermining the goals of patent law. Design patents remain the most 
promising alternative to trade dress protection for website design.307 
In fact, several popular sites have received design patent to protect their 
sites. These include Google,308 Facebook,309 Microsoft,310 Amazon,311 and Ya-
hoo!.312 These design patents cover the arrangement, spacing, and orientation of 
the various components of the different sites.313 With the adoption of the “ordi-
nary observer test” for design patents,314 proving infringement has become eas-
ier.315 Design patents provide protection for the aesthetic aspects of the website 
without the need to argue non-functionality.316 
Copyright, in contrast with design patents, protects the actual computer code 
itself. Websites are designed using HTML or XML, and the lines of source 
code can be copyrighted.317 While limited in scope, copyright protects against 
the outright stealing of source code. 
Finally, utility patents are available for novel and nonobvious functions.318 
These functions must be claimed as a method, while satisfying the Machine or 
Transformation test, i.e. that the method performs a transformation or is tied to 
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a particular machine.319 While becoming increasingly difficult,320 different web-
sites such as Facebook,321 Google,322 and Amazon323 have received utility patent 
protection for novel computerized methods on their websites.324 
Taken as a whole, these three forms of intellectual property protection will 
protect the source code, aesthetic design, and function of a website. Viewed 
this way, trade dress protection clearly encroaches upon these areas. While 
securing these protections might be costly, both in time and money, they still 
provide a strong defense against potential copiers. Add in the proper forms of 
trademark protection that the websites may receive, such as for the site name 
or logo, and it is clear that websites have a broad base of protection for their 
site designs. 
Limiting website intellectual property protection to only these forms also 
serves the public at large. Trademarks and trade dress protection have no expi-
ration date, so long as the owner of the trademark or trade dress continue to use 
it in commerce.325 Copyright,326 design patents,327 and utility patents328 all have 
defined expiration dates; after those dates the protected property enters the 
public domain. Internet technology and websites change rapidly. Giving one 
company or website exclusive use of a non-novel function or design that ordi-
narily would not be eligible for these forms of protection indefinitely may 
harm the marketplace of website designs. 
The current limited time-duration protection available for websites provides 
proper protection and incentivizes other companies to create new and innova-
tive designs in order to compete. For every Google, there is a Bing; for every 
Twitter, there is a Tumblr. The competition between these sites fosters new 
and exciting developments and creations. Inhibiting that competition by im-
properly giving indefinite legal protection to website trade dress would damage 
the innovative culture at the heart of the Internet.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Courts often struggle to catch up with advances in technology. With the In-
ternet constantly evolving, the courts often try to find novel ways to protect 
new technologies with outdated laws. This explains the court’s willingness to 
consider extending trade dress law to websites. 
Trade dress law is well-settled on the matter of functionality. Functional de-
sign cannot receive trade dress protection. Those who have argued for trade 
dress protection for websites do not fully appreciate the functional elements 
and design principles that tie those elements together when a website is creat-
ed. These principles place site functionality at the center of what the designer 
tries to do while creating the site. 
Site design and function are intertwined, and it is impossible to separate the 
two from each other. The simple truth is that websites are functional. They are 
an arrangement of functional elements, but they are also a functional whole 
made up of those elements. As a result, trade dress protection cannot be availa-
ble for websites. Steve Jobs had it right, especially in regard to websites, when 
he said that design is how something works, not just what it looks like.329 Web-
site design is how the website works. All is not lost for websites and web de-
signers, however. If design components of websites are truly functional, then 
utility patents are still available for innovative functional designs and fea-
tures.330 New advancements in design patents offer hope for ornamental design 
elements.331 And copyright is always available to protect the purely artistic el-
ements and the source code.332 
Like the Internet and technology, the law must always grow and change to 
adapt to new problems. The law must also explore all avenues to achieve jus-
tice for those that require it. Not all avenues will yield results, however, and 
this particular avenue should be closed off. 
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